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MEMORANDUM TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCES 
SUBJECT: Introduction of Legislation 
I am forwarding for your review the attached bill, S. 271, introduced in 
the 101st Congress by Senator Bob Graham of Florida, to reform procedures 
for collateral review of criminal judgments. This bill, known as the Habeas 
Corpus Reform Act of 1989, would make various changes relevant to the 
mission of the committee, several of which have been discussed at our 
meetings. I am also transmitting a copy of Senator Graham's remarks in the 
Congressional Record at the time he introduced this bill. 
I note that what appears to be an identical bill has also been introduced 
in the House of Representatives by Congressman Charles Bennett of Florida. 
The House bill is designated as H.R. 1090. 
Attachments 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
• 
101ST CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION S.271 
n 
To reform procedures for collateral review of criminal judgments, and for other 
purposes. 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
JANUARY 25 Oegislative day, JANUARY 3), 1989 
Mr. GRAHAM (for himself, Mr. NUNN, Mr. BRYAN, and Mr. MAcK) introduced the 
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the 
Judiciary 
A BILL 
To reform procedures for collateral review of criminal 
judgments, and for other purposes. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembkd, 
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
4 This Act may be cited as the\ "Habeas C~ Reform 
~
5 Act of 1989". 
6 SEC. 2. FINALITY OF DETERMINATION. 
7 Section 2244 of title 28, United States Code, is 




1 "(d) When a person in custody pursuant to the judgment 
2 of a State court fails to raise a claim in State proceedings at 
3 the time or in the manner required by State rules of proce-
4 dure, the claim shall not be entertained in an application for a 
5 writ of habeas corpus unless actual prejudice resulted to the 
6 applicant from the alleged denial of the Federal right asserted 
7 and-
8 "(1) the failure to raise the claim properly or to 
9 have it heard in State proceedings was the result of 
10 State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
11 the United States; 
12 "(2) the Federal right asserted -was newly recog-
13 nized by the Supreme Court subsequent to the proce-
14 dural default and is retroactively applicable; or 
15 "(3) the factual predicate of the claim could not 
16 have been discovered through the exercise of reasona-
17 ble diligence prior to the procedural default. 
18 "(e) A one-year period of limitation shall apply to an 
19 application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 
20 pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation 
21 period shall run from the latest of the following times: 
22 "(1) the time at which State remedies are 
23 exhausted; 
24 "(2) the time at which the impediment to filing an 
25 application created by State action in violation of the 
a,: 9 71 r,: 
•-
3 
1 Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, 
2 where the applicant was prevented from filing by such 
3 State action; 
4 "(3) the time at which the Federal right asserted 
5 was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, where 
6 the right has been newly recognized by the Court and 
7 is retroactively applicable; or 
8 "(4) the time at which the factual predicate of the 
9 claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
10 through the exercise of reasonable diligence.". 
11 SEC. 3. APPEAL AND REVIEW. 
12 Section 2253 of title 28, United States Code, 1s 
13 amended to read as follows: 
14 "§ 2253. Appeal 
15 "(a)(l) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding 
16 under section 2255 of this title before a circuit or district 
17 judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by 
18 the court of appeals for the circuit where the proceeding is 
19 had. 
20 "(2) There shall be no right of appeal from such an 
21 order in a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to 
22 remove, to another district or place for commitment or trial, 
23 a person charged with a criminal offense against the United 
24 States, or to test the validity of his detention pending re-
25 moval proceedings. 
es 211 is 
4 
1 "(b) An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals 
2 from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding if the de-
3 tention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 
4 court, or from the final order in a proceeding under section 
5 2255 of this title, unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
6 certificate of probable cause.". 
7 SEC. 4. PROCEDURES UNDER RULE 22 OF THE FEDERAL 
8 RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
9 Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is 
10 amended to read as follows: 
11 "RULE 22. 
12 "HABEAS CORPUS AND SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS 
13 "(a) Application for an Original Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
14 An application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be made to 
15 the appropriate district court. If application is made to a cir-
16 cuit judge, the application will ordinarily be transferred to the 
1 7 appropriate district court. If an application is made to or 
18 transferred to the district court and denied, renewal of the 
19 application before a circuit judge is not favored; the proper 
20 remedy is by appeal to the court of appeals from the order of 
21 the district court denying the writ. 
22 "(b) Necessity of Certificate of Probable Cause for 
23 Appeal. In a habeas corpus proceeding in which the deten-
24 tion complained of arises out of process issued by a State 
25 court, and in a motion proceeding pursuant to section 2255 of 
es 211 rs 
5 . 
1 title 28, United States Code, an appeal by the applicant or 
2 movant may not proceed unless a circuit judge issues a certif-
3 icate of probable cause. If a request for a certificate of proba-
4 ble cause is addressed to the court of appeals, it shall be 
5 deemed addressed to the judges thereof and shall be consid-
6 ered by a circuit judge or judges as the court deems appropri-
7 ate. If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice 
8 of appeal shall be deemed to constitute a request addressed to 
9 the judges of the court of appeals. If an appeal is taken by a 
10 State or the government or its representative, a certificate of 
11 probable cause is not required.". 
12 SEC. 5. STATE CUSTODY; REMEDIES IN FEDERAL COURTS. 
13 Section 2254 of title 28, United States Code, 1s 
14 amended-
15 (1) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows: 
16 "(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf 
17 of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 
18 court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant 
19 has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 
20 State, or that there is either an absence of available State 
21 corrective process or the existence of circumstances render-
22 ing such process ineffective to protect the rights of the appli-
23 cant. An application may be denied on the merits notwith-
24 standing the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies 
25 available in the courts of the States."; 
es 211 1s 
6 
1 (2) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows: 
2 "(d) In a proceeding instituted by an application for a 
3 writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 
4 judgment of a State court, a full and fair determination of a 
5 factual issue made in the case by a State court shall be pre-
6 sumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden 
7 of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing 
8 evidence.". 
9 SEC. 6. FEDERAL CUSTODY; REMEDIES ON A MOTION ATTACH-
10 ING SENTENCE. 
11 Section 2255 of title 28, United States Code, 1s 
12 amended by-
13 (1) striking the second paragraph which begins "A 
14 motion for such relief" and the penultimate paragraph 
15 which begins "An appeal may be taken"; and 
16 (2) adding at the end thereof the following new 
17 paragraphs: 
18 "When a person fails to raise a claim at the time or in 
19 the manner required by Federal rules of procedure, the claim 
20 shall not be entertained in a motion under this section unless 
21 actual prejudice resulted to the movant from the alleged 
22 denial of the right asserted and-
23 "(1) the failure to raise the claim properly, or to 
24 have it heard, was the result of governmental action in 
es 211 1s 
. 
7 
1 violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
2 States; 
3 "(2) the right asserted was newly recognized by 
4 the Supreme Court subsequent to the procedural de-
5 fault and is retroactively applicable; or 
6 "(3) the factual predicate of the claim could not 
7 have been discovered through the exercise of reasona-
8 ble diligence prior to the procedural default. 
9 "A two-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion 
10 under this section. The limitation period shall run from the 
11 latest of the following times: 
12 "(1) the time at which the judgment of conviction 
13 becomes final; 
14 "(2) the time at which the impediment to making 
15 a motion created by governmental action in violation of 
16 the Constitution or laws of the United States is re-
17 moved, where the movant was prevented from making 
18 a motion by such governmental action; 
19 "(3) the time at which the right asserted was ini-
20 tially recognized by the Supreme Court, where the 
21 right has been newly recognized by the Court and is 
22 retroactively applicable; or 
23 "(4) the time at which the factual predicate of the 
24 claim or claims presented could have been discovered 
25 through the exercise of reasonable diligence.". 
0 
es 2,1 1s 
January 31, 198!) CONGRESSIONAL .RECORD ..;.:'SENATE · 
HABEAS CORPUS REFORM ACT 
OF 1989 
. . . •_' 
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President. the 
Constitution of the United States af. 
fords every individual specific protec-
tions in Judicial _proceedings. Those 
constitutional protections are being 
Jeopardized under the pretense of :a le-
gitimate search for Justice. . . --~ 
Our courts are increasingly bur-
dened by frivolous and dilatory .,peti-
tions which impede the timely disposi-
tion of legitimate claims-including ·le-
gitimate habeas corpus requests. • ~ ·_ · · 
On January 25, Joined by my -col-
leagues Senator · NUNN,- MACK, '8.Ild 
BRYAN, I Introduced the _. Habeas 
Corpus Reform · Act -of -1989. · The 
Habeas Corpus Reform Act .is designed 
to protect prisoners' right while Jt pro-
tects the ·- integrity · of our Juditja1 
system. · ·. · _ 
The bill proposed includes a number 
of reforms of the current Federal 
habeas corpus process. . . 
For State prisoners: it imposes a 1-
year . limit -0n habeas . corpus .applica-
tions, normally running from exhaus-
tion of all possible State habeas corp~ 
petitions and appeals: _ . 
For Federal prisoners: it imposes a 2s. 
year limit on . Federal habeas corpus 
applications. normally running from 
the time of final judgment on the 
· original Federal determination . of 
guilt. 
This legislation also clarifies present 
iaw~stablishing the requirement 
that a State prisoner must ordinarily 
raise· all claims in accordance with 
State rules of procedure or be barred 
from asserting such claims in a Feder-
al habeas <X>rpus proceeding, And 
clearly states that a Federal habeas 
. court ·petition -may be denied on the 
merits ..,ithout requiring prior exhaus-
tion of State remedies. 
Finally, this legislation seeks· to re~ 
lieve the administrative burden on dis-
trict courts and simplify the appellate 
process by providing that an appeal 
from the district court in a habeas 
corpus proceeding may not be taken 
unless a certificate of probable cause is 
issued by a circuit Judi;e. . · _ 
There are at least four reasons that 
establish an urgent need for the re-
forms that ·this legislation would pro-
vide. . · . .-
First, the number of petitions filed is 
increasing .at 1lll alarming rate. 
Beginning :in the · late 1970's, the 
,. filing of Federal habeas corpus ·peti-
.tfons by State t>risoners increased sig-
nificantly; 198'7 filings .of · 9,524 · sur:.-
passed the -,all-tlme peak• figure - and-
represented an increase of 35 .percent 
over the 1978 filings. · . -: -., , : 
Given recent trends, 1988 will prob- · 
ably reflect the highest number of · 
State petitions ever -filed for . Federal 
habeas corpus relief. · 
Second, . -a significant number · of 
these petitions simply duplicate earlier 
litigation. 
According to a Department of Jus-
tice study of six district courts and one 
circuit court, more than 30 ·percent of 
the State prisoner habeas corpus peti-
tions were · filed by persons who · had 
filed ··one ·or ' more ''previous : Federal . 
habeas corpus petitions. More than 44 : 
percent had previously ·med at -least -
one petition in State court. . . · · · 
• Third. Federal district 'courts and 
courts of appeals are . u.na.ble to keep · 
up with these increases:· .In 1986, in 
both Federal district courts and U.S. ' -
courts of . ai,peals, the number of · 
habeas corpus cases filed exceeded the 
number .of habeas corpus cases re- . 
solved. .· " . - ·: , · 
. Although State habeas corpus peti-
tions in 1985 constituted less than 8 
percent of all Federal appeals filed, 
they constituted almost 19 percent of 
the backlog in Federal courts. ..· . 
Fourth, many petitions . are · filed 
years after the crime, when evidence is . 
stale or nonexistent. Th~_Department 
of Justice study found. that almost 
one~third of the habeas corpus peti-
tions · were filed more than 10 years 
after conviction; - . _. . 
In response to this crisis, Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnqtiist has ·appointed 
a commission to survey habeas corpus 
reform . proposals. · --:This ~- commission. 
headed by retired Supreme Court Jus-
tice Lewis Powell; has begun to :gather 
information on the extent of the prob-
lem and 11; expected to report to Con-
gress later this year. · - . 
Last year the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988 included· a provision to ensure 
that habeas corpus reform proposals 
receive timely action in the 101st Con-
gress. 
In section 7323 of the Act it was pro-
vided: 
Beginning on the date the Chief Justice of 
the United States forwards to the Commit-
tees on the Judiciary of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives the report and 
recommendation of t he Special Committee 
on Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sen-
tences, appointed by the Chief Justice of 
the United States and :chaired by Justice 
Lewis Powell. the chairman of the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary of the Senate shall 
have 15 days of session thereafter to intro-
duce a bill to modify Federal habeas corpus 
Procedure after having fatihfully considered 
the report and recommendations of the Spe-
cial Committee. If no ·such bill ls introduced 
by the chairman ·within the 15-day period. 
such bill may be introduced by the ranking 
minority member of the committee _within 
an additional 10 days of session. ,. 
We hope the Habeas Corpus Reform 
Act of 1989 will offer focus to the 
public debate and complement the ef-
forts of the Powell Commission. . · -.· :. . 
Habeas corpus is a cherished consti0 
tutionaI right . of -all -Americans . . Our 
Proposal will enhance the potential of 
habeas corpus to''ii.chieve iJustice exPe-
. ,ditiously · through . a · reduction . of , un-
seemly litigation and delay. - ~,: i·• ' ·· · 
It will bring us closer to timely Jus-
tice for society and·the accused; _, 
S'.Sll 
Our responsibility .is to ensure that 
. the system works in the way it was ori• 
· gianlly .- intended, .·: with · equal and 
- timely ·dispensation of Justice in all 
. habeas· corpus cases. '. .• : :_ . ;· 
.Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
:Sent that. the text of S. 271 be printed 
" in·, the · RECORD, to be .followed by a 
statement 1n: support of S. 271. 
[From the Florida.Times-Union, .Jan. 28, . · 
, , . . . , _· .. .1989]. _ . . ;. . . , ·: 
· ..lZGlsunozr CotnJ> CuT nm.Fl.ow or ~ _ 
. . ·.111T1:ltKmABLE LEGAL .AP1'EALs 
Tpe execution of .",l'ed Bundy baa brought 
li.n outpouring of philosophical opinions 
concernlng- the mentality 1Lild motivations · 
of ·this mass sex 1tlller whose cnly public . 
show of remorse, -1! tLnY. surfaced shortlY 
before he was put to death last Tuesd&Y. 
The .final chapter in -the -u&lY saga , of , 
Bundy also has rekindled Interest .in a more . 
practical side of the Bundy case: how he was · 
able through legal maneuvers to evade his 
tiltimate date with the electric chair for 
almost 10 years. , · 
One day after Bundy's execution. two U.S. 
senators, Bob . Graham. D -Fla.., and Sam 
Nunn, D-G&., filed legislation 1n -Congress to 
limit the power of federal judges to review 
appeals in state-capital-punishment, cues. 
Its purpose ls to limit the time for filing and 
disposing of death-row appeals. 
The idea ·is by no means new. For exam-
ple, former U.S. Sen. Lawton Chllea. D-Fla., 
won Senate approval 1n 1985 of slmllar legis-
lation, which became bogged down in the 
How,e of Representatives. Chiles' bill placed 
a three-year 'limit on -post-oonvlction legal 
·questions a defendant could raise based on 
existing Jssues, as opposed to new evidence. 
Under the proposed new legislation. a con-
victed killer would have one year after ex-
. haustlng state remedies· to file a federal 
attack on a conviction. and two years to 
challenge a federal order denying such an 
appeal. · 
· "No one," ·GratlAm sald.;''i.9 .well-served b:, 
exceaa ·-court-dela:,s. •-He. noted the sharp 
rise tn:death-row·appeals. to ·nearl7-- l0,OOO a 
:,ear. Graham bu ·firsthand knowledge of 
the aubJect.· During ~lght 'yean· as Plorlda 
governor. he signed 155 death warrants, all 
but 16 of ·1lleJn~tncludinr three for 
Bund.f-blocked by appeals. Oraham'a SUC· 
ceasor, Oov • .Bob .Martinez, hu signed M 
death warnnta. four resultinc in execu-
tions, includl.nc Bundy's. . 
-'But the ~ to eut .federal appeal 
time hu Its dissenters, u It baa had in the 
past. Larry Spaldln&'; who · heads the state's 
publicly 111Dded bureau &o provide lep.1 help 
to indigent Deatb-Rm<r IDmW'fl, ll&YI federal 
J~ ,are ID a ~tter J)Olitlon to rule obJee• 
ttfe]7 ·1n "death-cue ·-appea1a beclrulle· they 
are -not wttJeet -to " election. -u are state 
Judea . .- i ;_ · · · ; , ·• · 
. It ta.& matter of record th&hleath-row ap-
peals - ~tlm&te)7 -·wind . up tn · the , 1ederal 
court. -,xi are -decided -there: No -one can 
ariiue .a1t.h & defendant'• · .right to appeal. 
But allo-wine t.he system to be manipulated 
by frivoloua a,ppeals only .trustrates·the ends 
of Just!ce. 'That ta not the .J11lll)OSe or Intent 




TO: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITI'EE 
ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF /,") _ --~ _ -· D ,, /;A - ~ 1 t), 1 'i' 1 Cf 
CAPITAL SENTENCES /  ~-~ 
FROM: 1 J ,-?'<..~ ~ lJJ ALBERT M. PEARSON, REPORTER \ lt) v i. VJ.\., .u..,._ / S- r{A, 
RE: LEGISLATIVE REFORM PROPOSALS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This report attempts to formulate federal habeas corpus 
reform proposals that might be politically acceptable and at the 
same time have a reasonable prospect of addressing the problems 
of judicial administration created by death penalty litigation in 
this country. My working premise is that we should leave the 
scope of federal habeas corpus review intact and concentrate on 
eliminating its most cumbersome procedural features. In my view, 
this objective can be achieved without compromising fundamental 
fairness to inmates under death sentence. The legal and 
political framework for this approach is straightforward. I 
W.J-
propose recognition of a right to counsel in post-conviction c:.~-•1 .. :f c...-:-. -~---
proceedings as an inducement to overcome political objections 
federal habeas corpus reform in death penalty cases. 
rl,.A,. t.. 
'kt- I .hr I 
lu-G c_~-
.c~./-c.. c....-vt__ 
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL ~~/-~ 
Public frustration about the many delays of death penalty 
litigation often focuses on the defense lawyers. Fairly or not, 
they are seen as fervently opposed to the death penalty and 
willing to use their legal skills to thwart the legal system on 
behalf of profoundly undeserving clients. Serious questions are 
1 
✓ 
now being raised about their tactics. 1 In light of all this, one 
might expect the argument that lawyers are part of the problem 
not the solution. But that in fact is not the case. The 7L_ 
,, r 
l( availability of counsel at the post conviction phase in death ~ . 
penalty litigation -- b~ h s~ e and federal -- is perhaps the t:;:: 
most pressing issue on the agenda in the death penalty area. 2 
Concern about this issue transcends differences of opinion about 
the legitimacy of the death penalty as an appropriate form of 
punishment. 3 
Increased understanding of the dynamics of death penalty 
litigation has led to an important conclusion about the role of 
counsel. Adequate legal representation in death penalty cases 
involves more than an abundance -- some would say overabundance 
1 see Statement of Associate Deputy Attorney General Paul 
Cassell concerning Habeas Corpus and Capital Punishment 
Litigation before Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice 
and Agriculture of the House Comm. on Government Operations (Feb. 
26, 1988); Statement of Honorable Kendall Sharp concerning 
Capital Habeas Corpus Procedures: A Pragmatic Assessment before 
Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture 
of the House Comm. on Government Operations (Feb. 26, 1988). For 
recent judicial discussion of the abuse of the writ by delaying 
federal habeas filings until almost- the eveorexecution, see 
Ball v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 9?8, . 983 (5th Cir. 1988). 
2 This issue is pending before the Supreme Court now in 
Murray v. Giarrantano, __ U.S. __ , 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988) 
(certiorari granted October 31, 1988). For an extensive 
discussion of the issue, see Mello, Facing Death Alone: The 
Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 
513 (1988). 
3 Godbold and Mikva, Dialogue: You Don't Have to Be a 
Bleeding Heart, 14 Human Rights 22 (Winter 1987); Van de Kamp, 
The Right to Counsel: Constitutional Imperatives in Criminal 
Cases, 19 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 329 (1985) (article by 
Attorney General of California). 
2 
--
-- of 6oncern about fairness to persons facing execution. 
Attorneys are, after all, officers of the courts as well as 
"- '-22£ ~ !!F ~
advocates. Their actions in handling any case, death penalty or ~ 
otherwise, should not only promote fairness to the client but C,(),.~ 
also be compatible with the efficient administration of justice.-
Without counsel responsive to both obligations, the disposition 
of death penalty cases in this country will slow to the point 
that the death penalty itself is effectively nullified. 4 The 
death row population in America now exceeds 2,000 and more and 
more death penalty cases are working their way into the post-
conviction phase of review. 5 
In addition to heightened professional awareness of this 
issue, there has been some noteworthy political and judicial 
response. First, a significant number of states, some with large 
death row populations, provide for the appointment of counsel in 
4 According to a bulletin published in July 1988 by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 3,404 persons received the death 
penalty between 1973 and 1987. Of that number, 93 had been 
executed and 1,984 remained under death sentence as of December 
31, 1987. Nearly 300 new death sentences are imposed nationally 
each year. Capital Punishment 1987 at 10. 
5 For a discussion of the impact of death penalty litigation 
on the judiciary, Report of the Spangenburg Group, Case Load and 
Cost Projections for Habeas Corpus Death Penalty Cases in FY 1988 
and FY 1989 at 20 (Sept. 1987). 
3 
... 
post-conviction proceedings on some basis. 6 This legislation 
reflects the serious public policy considerations weighing in 
~ t...e---1-- -
~~ 
favor of extending the right to counsel beyond the limits set in 
/ 
Gideon, Argersinger and Evits v. Lu~ey. In addition to trends at 
-
the state level, Congress in 1988 amended the Criminal Justice ~ 
~- • <:><::::::J;c C a .._ - -- - -
. h . d · · ,~ •1~t..J.,I'<" Act to authorize t e appointment an compensation of counsel in - _, 
death penalty cases when they get to the federal system. 7 This 7-a-.11/~ 
6 A table drawn from a yet to be published manuscript by 
Wilson and Spangenburg, State Post-Conviction Representation of 
Defendants Sentenced to Death at 8, sets forth the law nationally 
concerning the appointment of counsel at the state habeas phase 
in capital cases: 
~ Total 
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*Statutory grounds are stated alternatively. 





7 This was part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. Pub. L. 
No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, Tit. VII, Section 7001(b) to be 
codified at 21 u.s.c. §848(q)(4)-(10). 
4 
enactment goes hand in hand with Congr~ sional fu~ dj_E~ for '1?_L.,l....~~ 
resource centers in 13 states which provide assistance to ~H--l"S 
~ > .. ,.,, .. 
attorneys who are handling death penalty cases. 0 
Finally, the issue of a constitutionally mandated right to 
counsel in state post-conviction proceedings is now before the 
Supreme Court in Murray v. Giarrantano, 9 a section 1983 class 
action filed by death row inmates in Virginia. In my experience, 
the facts in Giarrantano concerning the availability of counsel 
in death penalty cases do not differ materially from the 
circumstances existing in other states. It is never easy to find 
capable and willing lawyers to handle death penalty cases in any 
jurisdiction. Moreover, even when counsel can be found, the 
timing of appointment frequently is a problem because scarce 
legal resources tend to be devoted to the death penalty cases 
where the situation is most urgent those in which an execution 
date is imminent. In that setting, the considerations 
surrounding appointment of counsel understandably focus on the 
interests of the client and concerns about judicial efficiency 
are secondary if not irrelevant. The litigation strategy in 
Giarrantano is to expand the availability of counsel in death 
penalty cases by placing an affirmative duty on the state to find 
and appoint attorneys for habeas corpus proceedings or else 
8 Funding for the last five of the death penalty resource 
centers came in 1988. This was also part of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988. 
9 Cert. granted, 
1988) . 
U.S. __ , 109 S. Ct. 303 (October 31, 
5 
forfeit the right to impose the death penalty.i 0 
As Judges Godbold and Mikva have suggested, you don't have 
to be a bleeding heart to see the need for counsel in death 
penalty habeas litigation.ii But the fact remains that many 
perceive the right to counsel argument as a bleeding heart 
position and fear that defeat on that issue might have serious, 
though uncertain, repercussions on the status of the death 
penalty in America over the long run.i 2 In their view, the death 
penalty is a good-versus-evil controversy and anything that 
benefits death row inmates legally must be resisted. 
This reasoning will seem most persuasive to those who 
consider the right to counsel issue in death penalty litigation 
without reference to possible compensating adjustments elsewhere 
in the system of state and federal post-conviction review. The 
freedom to think about and address this problem comprehensively 
is a luxury which this Committee enjoys that is not available to 
the Supreme Court as it now considers how to rule in Giarrantano. 
ioThis strategy is based on the argument that the rationale 
of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) ought to be applied in 
death penalty cases to require the appointment of counsel in 
state post-conviction proceedings. 
iiDialogue: You Don't Have to Be a Bleeding Heart, 14 Human 
Rights 22 (Winter, 1987). 
i 2 This position is outlined in the amici curiae brief by the 
Attorneys General of 19 states who joined in support of 
Virginia's petition for certiorari in Giarrantano. Those states 
included Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, Missouri, South 
Dakota, Wyoming, Delaware, California, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, 
Indiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Nevada, Utah, South Carolina, 
Oregon, Maryland and Idaho. Florida supported Virginia's 
petition through a separate amicus brief. 
6 
While the Supreme Court may have the constitutional authority to 
impose an obligation on the states -- and perhaps even the 
federal government -- to provide counsel in death penalty cases 
at the post-conviction phase, judicial decision is surely not the 
only way to accomplish that goal, nor is it likely to be the most 
effective. 
Accordingly, a recommendation by this Committee concerning 
the appointment of counsel should have utility regardless of the 
outcome in Giarrantano. My recommendation for the appointment of 
counsel in death penalty cases runs along the following lines: 
(1) Counsel '--~--~ to death row inmates on -
request without the necessity of first filing a habeas corpus 
___..,.,-
petition, showing need for an evidentiary hearing or establishing 
probability of success on the merits. 13 This right would apply 
in both state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. The recent 
amendments to the Criminal Justice Act largely accomplish this at 
the federal level. The most serious gap in the system, however, 
has been at the state level and that of course is what prompted 
the Giarrantano litigation. 
In my view, the death penalty states get several benefits 
from this proposal, especially when they are considered in light 
of the other recommendations, particularly the statute of 
13As shown in the chart set out in note 6, there is 
considerable variation concerning the appointment of counsel at 
the post-conviction phase in the 37 death penalty states. To be 
discussed later in this report are the procedural changes that 
ought to be insisted upon as a quid pro quo for the right to 
counsel provision. 
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limitations. 14 At least four seem apparent. First, the states 
can respond at least in part to the contention that the system 
for the enforcement of the death penalty is procedurally unfair. 
Second, they can push more aggressively for the full development 
of all relevant legal issues at the earliest possible point in 
death penalty litigation. Third, they can strengthen the 
presumption of correctness afforded to state fact findings to the 
fullest extent possible under section 2254(d). And, fourth, they 
can argue with greater force that the application of state 
procedural default rules in death penalty cases is fair. In 
short, by having a skilled advocate on the other side at each 
stage of post-conviction review in death penalty cases, the state 
should gain material reassurance that one journey through the 
legal system will settle definitively whether or not an execution 
can be carried out. 
(2) Even if the states can be convinced that expansion of 
the right to counsel in death penalty cases is sound on public 
policy grounds, funding of this recommendation is going to be a 
delicate matter. Funding for indigent defense in criminal trials 
varies widely throughout the United States, but funding 
questions, until now, have been resolved at the state level 
exclusively. Death penalty cases are by far the most expensive 
of all criminal cases to try quite apart from expanding the right 
to counsel to include state and federal post-conviction review. 
14The statute of limitations, as will be discussed, would 
press counsel to advance the case through state post-conviction 
review. 
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The traditional division of responsibility between the federal 
government and the states might break down in this context. 
Here the impact of the Giarrantano decision could be 
significant. Should the court recognize in death penalty cases 
a constitutionally based right to counsel in state habeas 
proceedings, this would at least partially preempt the 
Committee's work. But there should still be ample room to 
discuss whether compliance with Giarrantano is better handled 
judicially or legislatively. For example, a strong case can be 
made for uniform federal standards in all death penalty states to 
assure competency of appointed counsel, adequacy of compensation 
and continuity of representation between state and federal habeas 
corpus review. If federal financial assistance were made 
available to ease the burden of a constitutionally mandated 
counsel requirement, it would promote those goals and it also 
might prove helpful in moderating public reaction to an unpopular 
ruling. 15 
If the Court's ruling in Giarrantano is against recognizing 
a right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, the 
15Here it is worthwhile to note that the state interest in 
funding defense counsel for indigents at trial is quite different 
than in the post-conviction context. The state has a paramount 
j
interest in convicting criminals, but it cannot achieve that goal 
without paying up front for legal representation for the poor. 
At the post-conviction phase, the state is being asked to 
subsidize an attorney to deny the state the fruit of its 
prosecutorial labor. The state has more choice about what to do 
at this juncture. For example, a state could decide that paying 
for attorneys in death penalty cases in post-conviction 
proceedings is too costly. Rather than pay the freight, a state 
could elect to eliminate its system of post-conviction review and 
shift all the costs on the federal government. 
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Committee's task would be to persuade the states to do what is 
constitutionally unnecessary. In this vein, recall that the 
federal government has already committed itself to appoint and 
compensate counsel in death penalty cases when they reach federal 
court. Here the funding mechanism would serve as one of two 
primary inducements for the states -- the other being the 
availability of a statute of limitation in the event the state 
makes counsel available in the state post-conviction proceedings. 
Both will probably have to be used. If counsel at the post-
conviction phase is genuinely helpful to the expeditious but fair 
consideration of death penalty cases, no one can say with 
certainty how helpful it would be or whether the gains in 
efficiency and finality are worth the direct costs of 
compensating counsel in all death penalty cases throughout state 
and federal habeas review. 16 Federal financial assistance to the 
states, however, would lower the costs of finding out and thus 
might tip the balance politically in favor of the counsel 
proposal under a voluntary scheme. 
Once the broad outlines of the counsel proposal are settled, 
if the Committee is inclined to favor this approach, it may be 
necessary to address some details of implementation. For 
example, what would be the mechanism for finding and appointing --------- "'---~ - ~-- --~..,. 
counsel at the state habeas phase of death penalty litigation? 
16Here the role of the statute of limitation would be 
crucial. Under a voluntary system, a state would not get the 
benefit of the federal statute of limitation unless it provided 
counsel in death penalty cases. 
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Should the specifics be left up to the states or is there a need 
to establish a joint federal-state entity? Do we need to address 
the role of the habeas trial judge in this scheme? One of the 
important issues surrounding the appointment of counsel will be 
monitoring death penalty cases to determine the need for 
appointment and then assuring continuity of representation 
between both the state and federal habeas phases of litigation. 
To me these considerations militate in favor of centralizing the 
appointment or recruitment process at the state level which is 
how it is handled de facto in most states now anyway. 17 
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Statutes of limitations have appeared in a number of habeas 
corpus reform proposals submitted to Congress in this decade. 
Each has been a part of a legislative package designed to limit 
rather dramatically the scope of federal habeas corpus review in 
section 2254 cases. 18 To my knowledge, n~ sal -- with or 
without a statute of limitation provision -- has been advanced to 
17A latent issue here is the role of the death penalty 
defense bar. One experienced death penalty specialist exprssed 
strong concern about giving authority to appoint counsel in death 
cases to state trial judges. He believed that they would not be 
inclined to appoint the specialists, but would opt instead for 
local attorneys who might not litigate death penalty cases as 
aggressively as they should at the state habeas phase. On the 
other hand, the responsibility for finding and appointing 
attorneys in death penalty cases probably ought not be turned 
over exclusively to people who are ideologically opposed to the 
death penalty. This is a general challenge for the bar as a 
whole and the involvement of attorneys who are not death penalty 
specialists might be helpful. 
18See in this connection the memorandum which I prepared for 
the November 30, 1988 meeting of the Committee. 
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address only problems of judicial administration in death penalty 
cases. In my view, the one situation where a statute of 
limitation makes sense is in death penalty cases. 
As you know, the incentives to litigate are different for 
death row inmates. Since guilt is typically not in serious 
dispute, they realistically must be resigned to the fact of 
indefinite confinement; their objective is to forestall the death 
penalty. Until some step is taken to schedule an execution, the 
death row inmate will be content with the status quo. He has 
little or no reason to start the clock with litigation until he 
must. His interest is conserving, if not gaining, time. The 
prisoner under sentence of confinement, however, is in an 
altogether different position. Unlike his death row counterpart, 
he has every reason to initiate habeas corpus review and to do so 
promptly because that is the only way he can quickly regain his 
liberty. Time works against him. Whether death row or not, all 
prisoners share a common outlook on one matter however; they have 
no reason to cease filing habeas corpus petitions until they get 
the relief they desire. 
In death penalty cases, the state's concern is both starting 
and stopping the post-conviction review process. None of the 
Supreme Court fashioned doctrines of procedural default or bar - -
address the start up question. Their aim is the termination of 
litigation. A statute of limitation in death penalty cases, 
however, would perform double duty. It would spur the death row 
inmate to initiate post-conviction review and in conjunction with 
12 
doctrines of bar and procedural default bring that review to a 
conclusion. Currently, death penalty states use the scheduling 
of an execution date or its threat as the driving mechanism to 
make death row inmates pursue post-conviction remedies. 19 Not 
only would a statute of limitation serve the same purpose, but it 
would do so without the waste of time and judicial resources 
associated with efforts to seek a stay of execution. 
How would a statute of limitation work? It should have the 
following features: 
(1) It should be linked to the appointment of competent 
counsel to represent death row inmates in both state and federal 
post-conviction proceedings. 20 
(2) It should span the time period from the end of state 
direct appeal in death penalty cases to the filing of a section 
2254 petition in federal district court. In death penalty 
litigation, there are two steps that are not subject to a timely 
filing requirement: the transition from direct appellant review 
of a criminal conviction to state habeas corpus review and the 
jump from state to federal habeas corpus proceedings. From the 
19Despite its occasional disadvantages, my impression is 
that many capital litigators -- both state and defense -- are 
comfortable with this informal working relationship. 
Interestingly, Florida and Alabama both have two year statutes of 
limitation applicable to post-conviction remedies. See Rule 
20.2(c), Ala. Temp. R. Crim. Proc. and Fla. R. Crim. Proc. 3.850. 
20This is the key quid pro quo in my proposal. If death row 
inmates receive the benefit of state paid representation, they 
will have to litigate at the post-conviction phase within a set 
time frame and they get only one opportunity for post-conviction 
review. 
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standpoint of finality of state criminal convictions and judicial 
administration generally, these unregulated time gaps are hard to 
justify. 
(3) It should be triggered by reference to one of two 
events, whichever occurs later: whenever, for state law 
purposes, the judgment of criminal conviction becomes final on 
direct appeal; or the date on which competent post-conviction 
counsel is appointed. This recommendation runs against the 
I 
formula in every habeas corpus reform proposal that I have seen, 
which make the date of exhaustion of state remedies the 
triggering date for the statute of limitations. 21 In my view, 
the date of exhaustion as it is currently understood can refer to 
more than one point in time. With respect to some issues, 
exhaustion occurs at the end of state direct appellate review and 
then again as to others at the conclusion of state post 
conviction review. I see no need to get caught up in slippery 
questions of state and federal law in determining when a statute 
of limitation begins to run. My formulation avoids that problem 
by linking the running of the statute of limitation to the 
~- --
concrete event of appointment of counsel. ._,..,--.....-,.... 
(4) Finally, whatever the length of the statute of 
limitation, it must have certain tolling rules. Most of the 
habeas corpus reform proposals submitted to Congress in the 1980s 
21The latest example is s. 271 which was introduced by 
Senator Graham of Florida. Section 2 of the bill proposes a one 
year statute of limitation linked to "the time at which state 
remedies are exhausted." 
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have included three: for newly discovered evidence; for newly 
recognized constitutional rights; and for rights a prisoner was 
unable to assert due to the unconstitutional action of the state 
which typically means Brady violations. 22 To that list I would 
add a rule tolling the statute of limitation for any time prior 
to the filing of a federal habeas corpus petition that a case is 
pending before a court of competent jurisdiction. This tolling 
rule, for example, would stop the running of the statute of 
limitation once a certiorari petition is filed with the U.S. 
Supreme Court after the state direct appeal has become final. It 
would also toll the statute when a state habeas corpus petition 
is filed and it would remain tolled while the case is being 
litigated at the state level. As long as a death row inmate has 
counsel and is actively litigating his case in a court of 
competent jurisdiction, he should suffer no prejudice to his 
right to file a section 2254 petition. 
As for the length of the statute of limitation, most 
federal legislative proposals have specified one year. A statute 
of limitation must be long enough, given the tolling rules, to 
allow a death row inmate a fair opportunity to prepare the 
necessary documents to move to a new stage of litigation. 23 I 
22s. 217 is illustrative of this pattern. 
23 If new counsel is appointed at the state post-conviction 
phase, he would need time to master the record, conduct any 
necessary investigation and prepare the pleadings. This could be 
a fairly lengthy process. However, when a case shifts from state 
to federal habeas review, less time would be necessary for that 
transition. 
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am inclined to think that a one year statute of limitation might 
be too tight. Two years, on the other hand, probably would leave 
too much down time. 
IV. LIMIT SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
State prisoners have a benefit that no other class of 
litigants in the United States has. Given the resources and 
access to counsel, they can petition for certiorari before the 
United States Supreme Court a minimum of three times. In death 
penalty litigation, it is not uncommon for an inmate to exercise 
this option every chance he gets. While the likelihood of 
Supreme Court review is generally quite low even in death 
penalty cases, there is still a concrete advantage to filing a 
petition for certiorari; the death row inmates gains time. The 
existence of multiple opportunities for Supreme Court review of 
state criminal convictions is more an accident of history than 
anything else. Does it make sense to maintain the system in its 
present form in death penalty cases? There are some strong 
reasons for change. 
First, if federal habeas corpus review is a surrogate for 
Supreme Court review of state court judgments in criminal cases, 
why allow a state prisoner both lower federal court review under 
section 2254 and multiple opportunities to petition the Supreme 
Court for certiorari? I would propose deferral of Supreme Court 
review in death penalty cases until after all lower court review 
16 
state and federal -- has been completed. 24 
Under current practice, Supreme Court review in death 
penalty cases is like focusing on a moving target. After direct 
appeal, the record in a state criminal case can change at least 
twice more: once in state post-conviction proceedings and then 
again during federal habeas review. A certiorari petition filed 
after state direct appeal or state post-conviction review is a 
roll of the dice which at a minimum gives the death row litigant 
extra time. Ordinarily, when a case reaches the Supreme Court, 
the denial of certiorari at least brings that case to an end even 
though the action otherwise has no precedential significance. 
This is not true of death penalty cases. If Supreme Court review 
in death penalty cases were to be deferred as suggested earlier, 
certiorari review would be more compatible with the Supreme 
Court's function as the court of last resort on constitutional 
issues. 
In this vein, deferred Supreme Court review would promote 
finality in death penalty cases in a way that is not currently 
possible. Once the Supreme Court has acted in a death penalty 
case without granting relief to a state prisoner, it would mean 
24The states might want to retain the right to petition for 
certiorari whenever a state supreme court rules in favor of the 
criminal defendant. In such a situation, a state would have no 
other forum to seek review of a state court ruling that 
misapplies Supreme Court authority. Retention by the states of 
the right to seek certiorari would not make Supreme Court review 
rules asymmetrical. The habeas petitioner who loses now has the 
luxury of both Supreme Court and lower federal court review. My 
proposal would put the states and death row inmates in roughly 
equivalent positions as far as the right to seek review of an 
adverse ruling is concerned. 
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the end of federal intervention. 25 Society would have afforded 
the litigant competent counsel and a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate all constitutional issues associated with his trial, 
including such standard post-convictions issues as newly 
discovered evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective 
assistance of counsel and new law. If this scheme does not 
satisfy the federal interest in the fairness of state death 
penalty trials, I don't know whether the case for federal habeas 
corpus reform in death penalty cases can be made. 
V. AUTOMATIC STAY OF EXECUTION 
If the statute of limitation concept is acceptable to the 
Committee in some form, a mandatory stay of execution ought to be 
considered as well. As previously noted, a statute of limitation 
would be a substitute in death penalty cases for the setting of 
an execution date or its threat. A tacit understanding now 
appears to exist that no death row inmate will be executed 
without at least one opportunity for state and federal post-
conviction review. The practice associated with stays of 
execution in both state and federal court has produced many 
complaints. But all who are involved in death penalty litigation 
agree that stay of execution practice consumes an enormous amount 
of time and energy and is largely unnecessary -- certainly during 
the first time through post-conviction review. Why not eliminate 
this feature of death penalty practice and conserve scarce legal 
25The death row inmate thereafter would have to go to state 
court for any further relief. 
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resources for an examination of the merits in each case? The 
enactment of an automatic stay of execution would serve this 
purpose. 
If the Committee is inclined to favor this idea, at least 
three additional considerations would need to be addressed. What 
would trigger the automatic stay of execution? What should be 
the duration of the stay? Finally, should there be any basis for 
staying executions after the automatic stay of execution has 
expired? It seems to me that the trigger for the automatic stay 
of execution and the statute of limitation should be the same 
event. This approach would create an incentive for the state (or 
a duly designated agency) to appoint counsel quickly. 26 As for 
the duration of the stay, it should remain in effect during state 
post conviction review, during federal habeas corpus review at 
the district and circuit court levels and finally during Supreme 
Court consideration of a certiorari petition. In short, the 
automatic stay would be effective in death penalty cases as long 
as necessary to make one trip through the state and federal 
judicial systems. Once the Supreme Court denies certiorari in a 
death penalty case, the stay would expire automatically. 
Federal review would be over and the inmate would be remitted to 
the state courts for relief, if any. 
26Under a voluntary system, the state's appointment of 
counsel would place the case on the fast track so to speak. The 
execution would be stayed on the condition that the case be 
litigated actively through state and then federal post-conviction 
review. 
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Should there be any residual authority for federal courts to 
stay executions after review of this character has occurred in a 
death penalty case? One can argue against such residual 
authority, but it would conflict with the premise underlying 
exceptions to the statute of limitation. For example, if, after 
this review process, a death row inmate could still make a 
colorable showing of innocence -- due to newly discovered 
evidence -- what would be the point of a right to further federal 
habeas corpus review if the state could execute him anyway? If 
the Committee favors the statute of limitations concept and 
recognizes exceptions as a part of the scheme, then it makes 
sense to recognize discretionary authority to grant stays of 
execution to the extent necessary to vindicate those exceptions. 
The stay of execution issue reveals how important the statute of 
limitation provision is to the scheme now under discussion. As 
indicated earlier, its exceptions must be drafted narrowly enough 
so that a valid second petition is rare, but not so narrowly that 
a demonstrably unjust death penalty conviction would go without a 
federal remedy. 
VI. EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT 
In my view, the total exhaustion requirement of Rose v. 
Lundy27 can be and frequently is a source of delay in death 
penalty litigation. Serious consideration should be given to 
modifying the doctrine. The problems with the exhaustion 
27 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 
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doctrine in death penalty cases stem in no small part from the 
typical discontinuities in the availability of legal 
representation. In the great majority of death penalty cases, 
the attorney who handled the case at trial drops out after the 
direct appeal. A search then begins for counsel to prepare a 
certiorari petition to the Supreme Court or to initiate state 
post-conviction review (or do both). Frequently, the skill of 
the new counsel exceeds that of the attorney who handled the case 
up to that point. This has consequences for the course of death 
penalty litigation in each case. 
If and when a death penalty case moves into the post-
conviction phase, new counsel invariably means a series of new 
issues. In addition, there is also the possibility that new 
counsel might want to offer more and better quality evidence in 
support of claims actually litigated and rejected at trial. If 
this process of refinement occurs at the state post-conviction 
phase where it should, the interests underlying the exhaustion 
doctrine are generally going to be satisfied. When the case 
reaches federal district court, the record will be complete. 
Everyone will know which issues are ripe for adjudication and 
1 which are subject to procedural default. The problem comes when 
this process of record refinement and record expansion does not 
occur at the state post-conviction phase. Since there are 
unexhausted issues in the case, the federal district court will 
dismiss and direct that the petitioner return to state court to 
present those issues for initial adjudication. The alternative 
21 
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to this time consuming step is for the state to waive the 
exhaustion requirement which is being done now with more 
frequency in death penalty litigation. 28 
It is clear, however, that compliance with the exhaustion 
requirement is not entirely detrimental to the interests of the 
death row inmate. Like the filing of a certiorari petition, the 
procedure guarantees additional time. It also guarantees at 
least the possibility of expanding the record factually and 
legally. The word "possibility" is used advisedly here since a 
litigant's return to state court under the compulsion of the 
exhaustion doctrine is usually an exercise in futility. 
Typically, such claims run head long into state procedural bar 
rules. If this is the upshot of the total exhaustion doctrine, 
it is an inefficient way to cull issues from a case. 
Why continue the exhaustion doctrine in its present form in 
death penalty litigation? Under the present proposal, which 
contemplates appointed counsel beginning at the state post-
conviction phase, there is a reasonable argument for change. Why 
not limit federal habeas corpus review in section 2254 cases to 
those claims actually presented to the state courts for 
adjudication? Under this approach the exhaustion doctrine would 
continue to serve the interest in comity but, more important, it 
28After some years of doctrinal disarray, the Supreme Court 
made it clear that a state court could waive the exhaustion 
requirement even if done inadvertently. Granberry v. Green, __ 
U.S._, 107 S. Ct. 1671 (1987). 
22 
~ 
would also be a rule of procedural default. 29 
How would this version of the exhaustion doctrine work? I 
believe that a death penalty litigant could raise the following 
issues in federal court: (1) all constitutional issues raised 
either at trial or on direct appeal; (2) any constitutional issue 
properly raised in state post-conviction proceedings; and (3) any 
constitutional issue newly raised in state post-conviction 
proceedings that was not raised at trial or on direct appeal but 
which habeas counsel believes should have been. 30 If an issue 
falls outside these categories, it would not be reviewable in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. A major example of an 
unreviewable issue would be ineffective assistance of state 
habeas counsel. 31 
A final matter is what to do with those issues that come 
within one of the exceptions to the proposed statute of 
limitations: (1) new law; (2) newly discovered evidence; and (3) 
official misconduct which prevents the litigation of a claim. 
29 In short, once a prisoner makes an election to file a 
habeas petition in federal court, he would be limited to the 
claims asserted in the petition but only if presented first to 
the state courts. As to "unexhausted" claims, the prisoner would 
be free to return to state court to try to litigate them, but he 
could not renew those claims again in federal court. 
30With respect to this category of issues, habeas counsel in 
death penalty cases would have to try to overcome state 
procedural bar rules in state court first before trying to 
satisfy the Sykes "cause" and "prejudice" standards in federal 
court. 
31This argument would appear to be foreclosed definitively 
by Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). See also Whitely 
v. Muncy, 823 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1987) and Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 




These issues could arise at any stage of post-conviction review. 
Since there may have been no opportunity to exhaust with respect 
to such issues, where would a death row litigant be expected to 
raise them initially? One solution would be to send the litigant 
back to state court for post-conviction review without delaying 
consideration of the other issues in the case. This would be a 
slight modification of the practice under Rose v. Lundy. This 
approach would satisfy comity concerns but at some cost in terms 
of achieving finality. An alternative approach would be to 
permit litigation of the late emerging issue in federal district 
court without first routing it back through the state judicial 
system for initial consideration. Comity interests would be 
subordinated under this approach to the presumptively paramount 
state interest in promoting finality in death cases. Less time 
would be needed for the late emerging issue to catch up with the 
rest of the case. 
VII. CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
This is a relatively minor issue in comparison to the others 
under discussion. I would eliminate the certificate of probable 
cause (CPC) requirement to appeal an adverse federal district 
court ruling in death penalty cases -- at least during first time 
federal habeas corpus review. Interestingly, the CPC requirement 
became law in 1908 to eliminate delay in capital cases. Unless 
there is some reason for it that I have missed or do not 
understand, the CPC requirement does not work as originally 
intended. I doubt that many CPCs have been denied in post-
24 
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Furman death penalty cases. Quite apart from its functional 
obsolescence in death penalty cases, the CPC requirement 
contradicts the working premise of this proposal which is that 
every death row litigant should get full federal habeas review of 
all properly presented constitutional issues at least once. The 
CPC requirement implies that some appeals to the circuit courts 
in first review death penalty cases might be frivolous and 
suggests the need to exercise vigilance in weeding them out. The 
time spent trying to do this doesn't seem worth it. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This scheme most likely would have to be voluntary as far as 
state participation is concerned. Whether the balance of 
advantage is enough to attract the interest of any states 
probably necessitates discussion of this proposal at some point 
with state officials. However, if a state wants the benefit of 
"faster track" death penalty procedures, this proposal would 
provide them. The other death penalty states, in effect, would 
make an election to live with post conviction review procedures 
in death penalty cases as they now stand. The voluntary system 
of state participation, however, has a major drawback to 
consider. Would a two track system of post conviction review in 
death penalty cases create problems that thwart the realization 
of benefits from having a "fast track" system of review in at 
least some death penalty states? 
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TO: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMI'.M.'EE 
ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF 
CAPITAL SENTENCES 
FROM: ALBERT M. PEARSON, REPORTER 
RE: NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND DATA ON DEATH PENALTY REVERSAL 
RATES 
DATE: APRIL 13, 1989 
I/ l<.JA-c~ 
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund provided me this week the 
following information on post-Furman death penalty reversal rates 
at the U.S. District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals levels. 
This breakdown is more specific than the statistics published in 
Death Row, U.S.A. Note that any time the writ of habeas corpus ? 
I I 
is granted it is counted as a "reversal." 
--------------- • 
1. As of 3-1-89 for the U.S. District 
Courts, the reversal r a f e is: -
--"--"' 
REVERSED (writ granted): 






2. As of 3-1-89 for the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, the rate is: 
l ~,.L CI 
REVERSED (reversal of 
writ denial or affirmance 
of writ grant): 
AFFIRMED (reversal of 
writ grant or affirmance 








3. When en bane decisions are included in 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals totals, the 
rate is: 
REVERSED (reversal of 
writ denial or affirmance 
of writ grant): 113 (40.65%) 
AFFIRMED (reversal of 
writ grant or affirmance 
of writ denial): 172 (60.35%) 
Total: 285 decisions 
In addition, LDF provided reversal rate data for cases 




1052 ( 40. 79% >l 
1527 ( 59. 21% )j 
State reversal rates are set out in APPENDIX A on a state-by-
state basis. 
The data does not reflect when these reversals occurred 
which would enable us to compare the current reversal rate to the 
reversal rate in any earlier year. As Supreme Court doctrine in 
the death penalty area settles and matures, there should be some 
evidence of a decline in the reversal rate. In this regard the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics has compiled data on removals from 
death row since 1973. It is set out below on a year-by-year 
basis and is categorized according to reason for removal. Note 
that these figures are based on the year of sentencing not the 
year of actual removal. 
2 
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TABLE I 
Reasons for Removal from Death Row and Number of 
Prisoners on Death Row at Year-end 1987, by year 
of Sentencing 
The figures in Table I show that 1164 of the 3404 (34.2%) 
persons sentenced to death from 1973 to 1987 have been removed 
from death row because of judicial action. When you consider 
1980 separately (a year when only 2 death penalty statutes were 
invalidated), the removal rate is 35.9%. In 1981 (when no death 
penalty statutes were invalidated), the removal rate is still 
30.0%. In 1982, the removal rate (21.7%) shows its first 
precipitous drop, but at this point the age of the case would be 
a possible reason for the drop. Remember that these figures are 
compiled as of December 31, 1987. 
3 
As shown in Table II, BJS provided me with its latest* 
information on removals from death row for the 1972-1987 period. 
Unfortunately, it is arranged on the basis of the year of removal 
from death row rather than the year of sentence as in Table I. 
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4 
However in Table II, a general trend for removals from death 
row as a result of judicial action is evident. The trend offers 
some insight into the reversal rate issue. For example, during 
the 1976-1978 period there were 551 removals: 442 were directly 
attributable to Supreme Court decisions holding state death 
statutes unconstitutional; 109 convictions or convictions and 
sentences were overturned on appeal. Since that time the removal 
rate has dropped and stabilized to a considerable extent. From 
1979 to 1987, there were 13 removals because of Supreme Court 
determinations that state death penalty statutes were invalid and 
in 575 cases either the conviction or conviction and sentence 
were reversed (an average of 63.8 per year). 
The bottom line is that the reversal rate in death penalty 
cases is significant whether you use Legal Defense Fund or BJS 
figures. As a political matter, the reversal rate issue could 
have a major influence on the reception that Judicial Conference 
proposals will have in Congress. 
One final examination of reversal rate data comes from a 
reexamination of the appendix compiled by the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund in its amicus brief in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 
(1983). In this appendix was an analysis of capital case 
decisions at the circuit court level from 1976 to February of 
1983. All circuits were included in the survey even if they had 
just one decision in a capital case. The overall reversal rate 
claimed in the analysis (based on 41 cases) was 73.2% when you 
included state appeals from an adverse district court ruling and 
67.6% when you excluded them. Because Justice Marshall quoted 
5 
these statistics in his dissenting opinion in Barefoot, Id. at 
915, they have received a wide circulation and support the 
argument that death penalty trials are error ridden affairs. 
My content analysis established that the reversal rate is 
actually the rate at which the habeas writ was granted. When you 
eliminate the cases which were remanded for procedural reasons, 
the result is a reversal rate of 51.2%. Admittedly this is a 
high figure but one must take into account the volatility of 
developing death penalty jurisprudence during this time. 
To allow some comparison with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
data, I did a similar analysis of the death penalty cases decided 
by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits in calendar year 1988. The 
Fifth Circuit had only one reversal out of 21 cases for a 
reversal rate of 4.7%. The Eleventh Circuit had 12 reversals out 
of 26 cases for a reversal rate of 46.1%. In two other cases the 
writ or a stay was granted, but no decision on the merits of the 
sentence or underlying conviction was reached. 
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APPENDIX A 
STATE SUPREME COURT REVERSAL RATES IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 
PRDS.PRG Reversal Rates by State on Direct Appeal: · Capital Cases 
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APPENDIX B 
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF REVERSAL RATE DATA DRAWN FROM 
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND BRIEF IN BAREFOOT V. ESTELLE 
Relief Conviction Sentence other 
Case I Granted I Reversed I Reversed I Relief 
Spinkellink v. Wain-
wright (578 F.2d 582) no 
Chenault v. Synchombe remand to 





I I I I 
Jurek v. Estelle 
(623 F.2d 762) I yes I involuntary confession 
Burns v. Estelle 
(626 F.2d 396) I yes I Wit~erspoon error 
Smith v. Estelle compelled psych. 
(602 F.2d 694) yes exam w/o Miranda 
Evans v. Britton unconst. death pen. 
(639 F.2d 221) yes precludes mit. circ. 
Stephens v. Zant 1 of 3 agg. circ. 
(648 F.2d 446) yes declared unconst. 
Potts v. Zant remand for 
( 638 F. 2d 727) yes evidentiary 
hearing 
I I I I 
williams v. Blackburn 
(679 F.2d 381) I no 
Baldwin v. Blackburn 
(653 F.2d 942) I no 
Granviel v. Estelle 
(655 F.2d 673) yes Witherspoon error 
3atte v. Estelle compelled psych. 
(655 F.2d 692) yes exam w/o Miranda 
~ashington v. Watkins 
I (662 F.2d 1116) yes I I Lockett 
Case 
Smith v. Balkcom 
(671 F.2d 858) 
Henry v. Wainwright 
(686 F.2d 311) 
Spivey v. Zant 
(683 F.2d 881) 
Alderman v. Austin 
(695 F.2d 124) 







(669 F.2d 222) I yes 
Moore v. Estelle 
(670 F.2d 56) I yes 
Washington v. Strickland 
(693 F.2d 1243) I yes 
Gholson v. Estelle 
(675 F.2d 734) I yes 
Ross v. Estelle 
(675 F.2d 734) I yes 
Gray v. Lucas 
(685 F.2d 139) 
Jordan v. Thigpen 
(688 F.2d 395) 
Bell v. Watkins 
(692 F.2d 999) 
Clark v. La. St. Pen 
(694 F.2d 75) 
Bass v. Estelle 
(696 F.2d 1154) 
Holtan v. Parratt 


















cir. at sentencing 
psych. exam w/o 
Miranda warning 
psych. exam w/o 
Mirandr1 warning 
Jury instruction 
error -- agg. 
circumstance 
Jury instruction 






Relief Conviction Sentence Other 
Case I Granted I Reversed I Reversed I Relief 
Knapp v. Cordwell 
(667 F.2d 1253) no 
Harris v. Pulley remand for 




Hays v. Murphy 
(663 F.2d 1004) I yes I I I remand for evid. hearing -- compe-
tency of 
prisoner 
I I I I 
Ford v. Strickland 
(696 F.2d 804) I no 
Young v. Zant 
(677 F.2d 792) yes ineff. counsel 
Machetti v. Linaham unconst. state jury 
(769 F.2d 236) yes selection procedure 
Goodwin v. Balkcom 
(684 F.2d 794) yes ineff. counsel 
Proffitt v. Wainwright consideration of 
( 685 F. 2d 1227) yes non-statutory agg. 
circumstance 
Hance v. Zant I I 
Witherspoon/inflamma-
(696 F.2d 940) yes tory remarks 




I I I • 
Stanley v. Zant 
(no. 81-7615) no 
Thomas v. Zant I remand for 
(no. 81-7675) yes ! evid. hearing 
--ineffective 
counsel 
I I I 
Darden v. Wainwright no 
APPENDIX C 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 1988 DEATH PENALTY DECISIONS 
Content Analysis to Show Ground for Reversal 
6 
Relief Conviction Sentence other 
Case I Granted I Reversed I Reversed I Relief 
Bell v. Lynaugh 
(858 F. 2d 978) I no 
Bridge v. Lynaugh 
(860 F.2d 162) I no 
Bridge v. Lynaugh 
(838 F.2d 770) I no 
Bryne v. Butler 
(845 F.2d 501) I no 
Bryne v. Butler 
(847 F.2d 1135) no 
Condova v. Lynaugh Jury instruction --
(838 F.2d 764) yes lesser included offense 
Earvin v. Lynaugh 
(860 F.2d '623) I no 
Edwards v. Scroggy 
(849 F.2d 204) I no 
Franklin v ..... Lynaugh 
(860 F.2d 165) I no 
Garrett v, Lynaugh 
(842 F.2d 118) I no 
Gilliard v. Scroggy 
(847 F. 2d 1141) I no 
Graham v. Lynaugh 
(854 F.2d 715) I no 
Hawkins v. Lynaugh 
(844 F. 2d 1132) I no 
King v. Lynaugh 
(850 F.2d 1055) I no 
Case 
Landry v. Lynaugh 
(844 F.2d 1122) 
Lowerfeld v. Butler 
(843 F.2d 183) 
Mana v. Lynaugh 
(840 F.2d 1194) 
Sawyer v. Butler 
(848 F.2d 582) 
Salvage v. Lynaugh 
(842 F.2d 89) 
Streetman v. Lynaugh 
(835 F.2d 1521) 
Williams v. Lynaugh 

















ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 1988 DECISIONS 
Content Analysis to Show Ground for Reversal 
Case 
Berryhill v. Zant 
(858 F.2d 633) 
Buford v. Dugger 
(841 F.2d 1057) 
Bundy v. Dugger 
(850 F. 2d 1402) 
Corn v. Kemp 
837 F.2d 1474) 
Cervi .v. Kemp 
(855 F.2d 702) 
Daugherty v. Dugger 
(839 F.2d 1426) 
Dunkins v. Thigpen 
(854 F.2d 394) 
Fleming v. Kemp 
(837 F.2d 940) 
Godfrey v. Kemp 
(836 F.2d 1557) 
Harick v. Dugger 
(844 F.2d 1464) 
Jackson v. Dugger 
(837 F.2d 1469) 
Julius v. Johnson 
(854 F.2d 400) 
Mann v. Dugger 
(844 F.2d 1446) 
Middleton v. Dugger 




















women on jury list 
Jury instruction -- Burden 
of Proof in insanity case 
involuntary confession 
Jury instruction -- Burden 







unconst. to advise 
jury death penalty 
presumed proper 
Jury instruction --






Presnell v. Kemp 
(835 F.2d 1567) 
Ruffin v. Dugger 
(848 F.2d 1512) 
Singleton v. Thigpen 
(856 F.2d 126) 
Smith v. Dugger 
(840 F.2d 878) 
Smith v. Kemp 
(855 F.2d 712) 
Stano v. Dugger 
(846 F.2d 1286) 
Stephens v. Kemp 
(846 F.2d 642) 
Stewart v. Dugger 
(847 F.2d 1486) 
Stone v. Dugger 
(837 F.2d 1477) 
Waters v. Kemp 
(845 F.2d 260) 
Williams v. Kemp 
(846 F.2d 1276) 
Willis v. Kemp 








































TO: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE 
ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF 
CAPITAL SENTENCES 
FROM: ALBERT M. PEARSON, REPORTER 
RE: CASE CHRONOLOGIES 
DATE: APRIL 17, 1989 
Attached is a copy of a revised and supplemented list of 
death penalty cases that have ended in execution. There are now 
44 case histories on the list. 
The information is arranged to show the overall time from 
sentence to execution and then to indicate how much time in 
litigation is spent in the state and lower federal courts and the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Also shown is the amount of down time in 
each case which means the time when a death penalty case is not 
actually pending before any court. This data is a reflection of 
what happens in a death penalty case after the trial phase is 
done and the conviction review process begins. 
The average times are as follows: 
1. state court (including 
state habeas review) 2.85 years (40%) 
2. federal court (excluding 
U.S. Supreme Court review) 2.00 years (28%) 
3. Supreme Court 1.20 years (17%) 
4. Down Time 1.03 years (15%) 
Overall sentence to execution 7.09 years 
According to Bureau of Justice Statistics data compiled as 
of December 31, 1987, the average time from sentence to execution 








Average elapsed time from 
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1 
.. 
DEATH PENALTY CASE HISTORIES 
TIME SHOWN IN DAYS, YEARS AND BY PERCENTAGE OF 
TOTAL TIME FROM SENTENCE TO EXECUTION 
Sentence to State Federal Supreme Down 
Inmate Execution Court Court Court Time 
Evans (ALA) 2155 574 808 676 97 
Crime: 1/5/77 5.90 1.57 2.21 1.85 .27 
Execution: 4/22/83 -- 27% 37% 31% 5% 
6.29 years 
Jones (ALA) 1215 545 280 332 58 
Crime: 8/7/81 3.32 1.49 .77 .91 .16 
Execution: 3/21/86 -- 45% 23% 27% 5% 
4.62 years 
Ritter (ALA) 3768 1568 1315 806 79 
Crime: 1/5/77 10.32 4.29 3.60 2.21 .21 
Execution: 8/28/87 -- 42% 35% 21% 2% 
10.63 years 
Sullivan (FL) 3634 386 425 734 1089 
Crime: 4/9/73 9.96 1.06 3.90 2.01 2.98 
Execution: 11/30/83 -- 11% 39% 20% 30% 
10.65 years 
Antone (FL) 2716 1368 60 271 470 
Crime: 10/23/75 7.44 3.75 1. 66 .74 1.29 
Execution: 1/26/84 -- 50% 22% 10% 18% 
8.29 years 
Goode (FL) 2575 1247 485 348 495 
Crime: 3/5/76 7.05 3.42 1.33 .95 1.36 
Execution: 4/5/84 -- 48% 19% 14% 19% 
8.10 years 
Adams (FL) 3509 1074 1323 601 511 
Crime: 11/12/73 9.61 2.94 3.62 1.64 1.40 
Execution: 5/10/84 -- 30% 38% 17% 15% 
10.5 years 
Shriner (FL) 2608 1215 570 247 576 
Crime: 10/22/76 7.15 3.33 1.56 6.77 1.58 
Execution: 6/20/84 -- 47% 22% 9% 22% 
7.7 years 
Washington (FL) 2417 320 597 805 695 
Crime: 9/20/76 6.62 .88 1. 64 2.20 1.90 
Execution: 7/13/84 -- 13% 25% 33% 29% 
8.1 years 
.. 
Sentence to State Federal Supreme Down 
Inmate Execution Court Court Court Time 
Dobbert (FL) 3786 1648 662 878 598 
Crime: 12/31/71 10.37 4.51 1.81 2.40 1.64 
Execution: 9/7/84 -- 44% 17% 23% 16% 
12.7 years 
Henry (FL) 3740 681 1096 781 1182 
Crime: 3/23/74 10.24 1.87 3.0 2.14 3.24 
Execution: 9/20/84 -- 18% 29% 21% 32% 
10.5 years 
Palmes (FL) 2653 1410 654 301 288 
Crime: 11/4/76 7.27 3.86 1.79 .82 .79 
Execution: 11/8/84 -- 54% 25% 11% 10% 
7.95 years 
Raulerson (FL) 3400 1917 733 538 212 
Crime: 4/27/75 9.31 5.25 2.0 1. 47 .58 
Execution: 1/20/85 -- 56% 21% 16% 7% 
9.80 years 
Witt {FL) 4032 1426 1124 715 767 
Crime: 10/28/73 11.04 3.91 3.08 1. 96 2.10 
Execution: 3/6/85 -- 35% 28% 18% 19% 
11.37 years 
Francois (FL) 2411 1209 699 155 348 
Crime: 7/27/77 6.60 3.31 1.91 .42 .95 
Execution: 5/29/85 -- 50% 29% 6% 15% 
8.15 years 
Thomas {FL) 3286 908 1052 368 958 
Crime: 1/1/76 9.0 2.48 2.88 1.0 2.62 
Execution: 4/15/86 -- 28% 32% 11% 29% 
10.3 years 
Funchess {FL) 2330 572 1199 235 324 
Crime: 12/16/74 6.38 1.57 3.28 .64 .89 
Execution: 4/22/86 -- 25% 51% 10% 14% 
11.36 years 
Straight (FL) 3197 1390 1234 310 263 
Crime: 10/4/76 8.75 3.8 3.38 .85 .72 
Execution: 5/20/86 -- 43% 39% 10% 8% 
9.65 years 
White (FL) 3395 1324 543 683 845 
Crime: 7/27/77 9.30 3.63 1. 49 1.87 2.31 




Sentence to State Federal Supreme Down 
Inmate Execution Court Court Court Time 
Darden (FL) 5147 863 2217 1308 759 
Crime: 9/8/73 14.1 2;36 6.07 3.58 2.08 
Execution: 11/7/88 -- 17% 43% 25% 15% 
14.5 years 
Daugherty (FL) 2736 1163 192 628 753 
Crime: 3/1/76 7.49 3.18 .53 1.72 2.06 
Execution: 11/7/88 -- 42% 7% 23% 28% 
12.7 years 
Gray (MS) 2465 1076 778 553 58 
Crime: 6/25/76 6.75 2.95 2.13 1.51 .15 
Execution: 8/26/83 -- 44% 32% 22% 2% 
7.19 years 
Johnson (MS) 2468 760 1385 88 235 
Crime: 6/2/79 6.76 2.08 3.79 .24 .64 
Execution: 5/20/87 -- 31% 56% 4% 9% 
7.97 years 
Evans 1188 633 100 410 45 
Crime: 4/4/81 3.25 1.73 .27 1.12 .12 
Execution: 7/8/87 -- 53% 8% 35% 4% 
6.25 years 
Brooks (TX) 1830 1350 371 85 24 
Crime: 12/14/76 5.01 3.70 1.02 .23 .07 
Execution: 12/7/82 -- 74% 20% 5% 1% 
5.99 years 
Aut ry (TX) 1259 498 398 297 70 
Cr i me: 4/20/80 3.45 1.36 1.09 .81 .19 
Execution: 3/14/84 -- 40% 32% 23% 5% 
3.90 years 
O'Bryan (TX) 3223 1841 947 357 78 
Crime: 10/31/74 8.83 5.04 2.59 .98 .21 
Execution: 3/31/84 -- 57% 29% 11% 3% 
9.42 years 
Barefoot (TX) 2165 557 800 263 556 
Crime: 8/7/78 5.96 1.53 2.19 .72 1.52 
Execution: 10/30/84 -- 26% 37% 12% 25% 
6.15 years 
Skilleron (TX) 2483 1011 645 562 265 
Crime: 10/23/74 6.80 2.77 1.77 1.54 .73 
Execution: 1/16/85 -- 41% 26% 23% 10% 
10.24 years 
I 
Sentence to State Federal Supreme Down 
Inmate Execution Court Court Court Time 
De La Rosa (TX) 1399 658 220 284 237 
Crime: 8/22/79 3.83 1. 80 .60 .78 .65 
Execution: 5/15/85 -- 47% 16% 20% 17% 
5.73 years 
Bass (TX) 2114 881 510 324 399 
Crime: 8/16/79 5.79 2.41 1.40 .89 1.09 
Execution: 3/12/86 -- 42% 24% 15% 19% 
6.58 years 
Esquivel (TX) 2854 613 1294 372 574 
Crime: 6/8/78 7.81 1. 68 3.54 1.02 1.57 
Execution: 6/9/86 -- 21% 45% 13% 21% 
8.01 years 
Brock (TX) 4153 728 2441 631 353 
Crime: 5/21/74 11.37 1. 99 6 . 69 1.73 .97 
Execution: 6/18/86 -- 18% 59% 15% 8% 
12.08 years 
Smith (TX) 1796 1274 184 2 337 
Crime: 2/3/78 4.92 3.49 .50 .005 .92 
Execution: 8/22/86 -- 71% 10% 0% 19% 
8.56 years 
Wicker (TX) 2031 1143 384 356 148 
Crime: 4/4/80 5.56 3.13 1.05 .97 .41 
Execution: 8/26/86 -- 56% 19% 18% 7% 
6.40 years 
Andrade (TX) 770 399 121 129 121 
Crime: 3/20/84 2.11 1.09 .33 .35 .33 
Execution: 12/18/86 -- 51% 16% 17% 16% 
2.75 years 
Hernandez (TX) 2322 849 148 411 914 
Crime: 6/19/80 6.36 2.32 .41 1.13 2.50 
Execution: 1/30/87 -- 36% 6% 18% 40% 
6.62 years 
Williams (TX) 3168 2099 511 443 115 
Crime: 6/12/78 8.68 5.75 1.40 1.21 .31 
Execution: 5/28/87 -- 66% 16% 14% 4% 
8.97 years 
Johnson (TX) 1491 672 405 342 74 
Crime: 4/8/82 4.08 1. 84 1.11 .94 .20 
Execution: 6/24/87 -- 45% 27% 23% 5% 
5.22 years 
j • • 
Sentence to State Federal Supreme Down 
Inmate Execution Court Court Court Time 
Thompson (TX) 1952 1333 164 292 163 
Crime: 5/21/77 5.34 3.65 .45 .80 .45 
Execution: 7/8/87 -- 68% 8% 15% 9% 
9.70 years 
Starvaggi (TX) 3513 1191 1867 364 91 
Crime: 1/28/77 9.62 3.26 5.11 1.00 .25 
Execution: 9/10/87 -- 34% 53% 10% 3% 
10.62 years 
Stre etman (TX) 1612 827 623 1 161 
Crime: 12/17/82 4.41 2.26 1.71 .002 .44 
Execution: 1/7/88 -- 51% 39% 0% 10% 
5.06 years 
Franklin (TX) 2411 1226 481 629 75 
Crime: 7/25/75 6.60 3.36 1. 32 1.72 .20 
Execution: 11/3/88 -- 51% 20% 26% 4% 
13.29 
Landry (TX) 2038 1412 94 370 162 
Crime: 8/6/82 5.58 3.87 .16 1.01 .44 
Execution: 12/13/88 -- 69% 5% 18% 8% 
6.36 years 
